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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Juan Carlos Fuentes Pina appeals from his conviction for first-degree
murder challenging his conviction under a felony murder theory. In this appeal
Pina requests a substantial change to Idaho's felony murder rule.
Statement of the Facts and Course of the Proceedinas
Pina kidnapped Jesse Naranjo at gunpoint at a drug house. (Trial Tr., vol.

ll,p.939,L.13-p.958,L.9;p.1004,L.11-p.l052,L.11;~0l.III,p.1151,L.
8

- p. 1164, L. 14; p. 1263, L.

19 - p. 1265, L. 17.) In the house Pina, armed

with a sawed-off shotgun, ordered Naranjo to his knees. (Trial Tr., voi. Ill, p.
1164, L. 1 8 - p . 1165, L. 22; p. 1206, L. 2 0 - p . 1207, L. 15; p. 1214, L. 2 2 - p .
1217, L. 3.) Johnny Shores, who lived at the house, entered the room where
Pina held Naranjo at gunpoint. (Trial Tr., vol. Ill, p. 1165, Ls. 8-25; p. 1217, L. 11

- p. 1219, L. 20; p. 1275, L. 9 - p. 1284, L. 4.) Pina passed the shotgun to
Shores. (Trial Tr., vol. Ill, p. 1220, L. 15 - p. 1221, L. 12; p. 1284, L. 8 - p. 1286,
L. 15.)
Seeing an opportunity, Naranjo attempted to seize the shotgun while it
was being passed by Pina to Shores. (Trial Tr., vol. Ill, p. 1220, L. 15 - p. 1221,
L. 12; p. 1286, Ls. 16-25.) The three men wrestled for the shotgun. (Trial Tr.,

VOI.II, p. 958, L. 22 - p. 960, L. 9; p. 1052, L. 23 - p. 1061, L. 2; VOI.Ill, p. 1166,
L. I- p. 1167, L. 8; p. 1220, L. 15 - p. 1221, L. 12; p. 1286, L. 21 - p. 1299, L.
14.)

Eventually Shores secured the shotgun, and Naranjo attempted to flee

through a back door. (Trial Tr., VOI.Ill, p. 1167, L. 9 - p. 1168, L. 13; p. 1287, L.

4 - p. 1289, L. 7.) Shores, with the gun, followed Pina and Naranjo as they
moved toward the back door, Pina hitting Naranjo as he tried to flee. (Trial Tr.,
vol. Ill, p. 1287, L. 18 - p. 1288, L. 14.) As Pina fought to prevent Naranjo from
escaping through the back door, Shores shot Naranjo with the shotgun, killing
him. (Trial Tr., vol. I, p. 366, L. 6 - p. 374, L. 15; p. 380, L. 22 - p. 388, L. 14; p.
395, L. 15-p.444, L. 11; p.465, L.21 -p.495, L. 18; p. 500, L. 1 7 - p . 513, L.
9 ; ~ 0 l . I I , p . 9 6 0L
, . 7 - p . 9 6 3 , L . l i p . 1061,L. 1 8 - ~ . 1 0 6 4 , L . 8 ~ ~ 0 l . l i l ,1259,
p.
Ls. 11-15; p. 1288, L. 19-p. 1290, L. 11.)
A grand jury indicted Pina for first degree felony murder. (R., vol. I, pp.
17-18.) The matter proceeded to trial. (See generally, Trial Tr.) After the state
rested Pina moved for acquittal, arguing that the evidence did not support the
state's theory of felony murder because, he claimed, the evidence showed that
Shores was acting independently of Pina. (Trial Tr., vol. Ill, p. 1390, L. 15 - p.
1394, L. 12; p. 1396, Ls. 9-25; see also p. 1400, L. 17 - p. 1402, L. 17; p. 1532,
L. 5 - p. 1534, L. 3.) The state responded by arguing that, although Shores was
not involved at the start of the kidnapping, the evidence showed he was acting in
concert with Pina, and against Naranjo, once he became involved. (Trial Tr., vol.
III,p. 1394, L. 1 4 - p . 1396, L . 7 ; s e e a l s o p . 1398, L. 11 - p . 1400, L. 15; p.
1534, L. 5 - p. 1535, L. 24.) The court took a brief recess, then denied the
motion. (Trial Tr., vol. Ill, p. 1397, Ls. 1-5; p. 1403, L. 2 - p. 1405, L. 9; p. 1407,
Ls. 6-15; p. 1536, L. 21 - p. 1538, L. 25.)
After the last evidence was presented, Pina temporarily refused to appear
in court. (Trial Tr., vol. Ill, p. 1607, L. 3 - p. 1613, L. 23.) He later informed the

court, through the jail, that he would attend if he could represent himself. (Trial
Tr., vol. Ill, p. 1616, L. 24

- p.

1617, L. 7.) The court denied the request as

untimely. (Trial Tr., vol. Ill, p. 1621, Ls. 3-20.)
After the trial, the jury found Pina guilty. (R., vol. II, pp. 290-91.) The
judge entered a judgment of conviction and Pina timely appealed. (R., vol. Ill,
pp. 463-72.)

ISSUES
Pina states the issues on appeal as:
1
The state failed to present any evidence to support a finding
that Mr. Pina and Mr. Shores were acting in concert with one
another when Mr. Shores killed Mr. Naranjo. Was Mr. Pina denied
due process of law as guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment of
the United State Constitution when he was convicted absent proof
beyond a reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute
the crime of felony murder?
2.
Regardless of whether Idaho's felony murder statute
imposes felony murder liability under either an agency theory or a
proximate cause theory, did the district court err when it gave the
jury instructions which allowed the jurors to convict Mr. Pina under
a strict liability theory?
Did the district court err when, without any inquiry into the
merit of the reason for discharge, the quality of counsel's
representation prior to the request, whether any disruptive effect
would result from the discharge, the rationale for the timing of the
request, the complexity and stage of the proceedings, and any prior
requests by the defendant to discharge counsel it denied his midtrial motion to proceed pro se?

3.

(Appellant's brief, p. 12.)
The state rephrases the issues as:
1.
Do Pina's claims of instructional error and insufficient evidence fail
because Pina's central premise -that a required element of felony murder is that
the killing had to be committed by either the defendant himself or a co-felon - is
without merit?
Has Pina failed to show error in the district court's determination that his
2.
request to represent himself, made just before the close of presentation of
evidence, was untimely?

ARGUMENT

I.
Pina Has Failed To Show Either Instructional Error Or Insufficient Evidence
Because He Is Guilty Of Felony Murder For The Killing Of Jesse Naranio During
The Course Of A Kidnapping Even if Shores Was Not A Direct Participant In The
Kidnapping
A.

Introduction
The evidence presented at trial showed that Pina kidnapped Jesse

Naranjo, and that Shores shot Naranjo while Naranjo was trying to escape. Pina
claims both instructional error and insufficient evidence based on his assertion
that Idaho law requires that the state prove that Shores was actually a participant
in the kidnapping, and not merely that the killing happened in the course of the
kidnapping performed by Pina. (Appellant's brief, pp. 13-34.) Specifically, he
argues that the jury should have been instructed that an element of felony
murder was that the killer had to be either the defendant or a co-felon
(Appellant's brief, pp. 29-34), and that the evidence does not support a
conclusion that Shores participated in the kidnapping (Appellant's brief, pp. 1329). These arguments fail because Idaho's felony murder law applies to all
killings committed during the course of a felony, not just to killings committed by
the defendant or those acting "in concert with or in furtherance of' the underlying
felony.

In addition, even if Pina were correct on the law, and Idaho's felony

murder rule applied only to killings committed by actual participants in the
underlying felony, the jury could reasonably have concluded from the evidence
that Shores shot Naranjo to prevent him from escaping, making Shores a
participant in the kidnapping.

B.

Standard of Review
An appellate court will not set aside a judgment of conviction entered upon

a jury verdict if there is substantial evidence upon which a rational trier of fact
could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable
doubt. State v. Sheahan, 139 ldaho 267, 285-86, 77 P.3d 956, 974-75 (2003);
State v. Reves, 121 ldaho 570, 826 P.2d 919 (Ct. App. 1992). The appellate
court will not substitute its view for that of the jury as to the credibility of the
witnesses, the weight to be given to the testimony, and the reasonable
inferences to be drawn from the evidence. State v. Hovle, 140 ldaho 679, 68384, 99 P.3d 1069, 1073-74 (2004) (plurality); State v. Knutson, 121 ldaho 101,
104, 822 P.2d 998, 1001 (Ct. App. 1991); State v. Decker, 108 ldaho 683, 684,
701 P.2d 303, 304 (Ct. App. 1985).
In determining if the evidence is substantial and competent, it will be
considered in the light most favorable to the prosecution. State v. Miller, 131
ldaho 288, 292, 955 P.2d 603, 607 (Ct. App. 1997); State v. Knutson, 121 ldaho
101, 104, 822 P.2d 998, 1001 (Ct. App. 1991). Substantial evidence is present
when a "reasonable mind" could conclude that guilt was proved beyond a
reasonable doubt. State v. Hovle, 140 ldaho 679, 683-84, 99 P.3d 1069, 107374 (2004) (plurality).
Statutory interpretation is a question of law given free review. State v.
Nickerson, 121 ldaho 925,927, 828 P.2d 1330,1332 (Ct. App. 1992).

C.

Idaho's Felony Murder Law Applies To All Killings Committed Durina The
Course Of A Felony, Not Just To Killings Committed Bv The Defendant Or
Those Actinq "In Concert With Or In Furtherance Of' The Underlying

FelonV

Contrary to Pina's argument, Idaho's felony murder law does not require
that the person committing the killing be a participant in the underlying felony.
Instead, ldaho law requires only that the killing be in the course of the underlying
felony.
The interpretation of a statute must begin with the literal words of the
statute. State v. Schwartz, 139 ldaho 360, 362, 79 P.3d 719, 721 (2003). It is a
well established principle of statutory interpretation that "the clearly expressed
intent of the legislature must be given effect, thus leaving no occasion for
construction where the language of a statute is plain and unambiguous." State v.
McCoy, 128 ldaho 362, 365, 913 P.2d 578, 581 (1996) (citations omitted).
In Idaho, murder is "the unlawful killing of a human being ... with malice
aforethought ...." I.C.

5

18-4001. Malice is implied "when no considerable

provocation appears, or when the circumstances attending the killing show an
abandoned and malignant heart." I.C. 5 18-4002. "Any murder committed in the
perpetration of, or attempt to perpetrate, ... kidnapping ..., is murder of the first
degree." I.C. 5 18-4003(d). These statutes have been interpreted to mean that,
in the case of felony murder, the intent to commit the underlying felony
substitutes for the malice element of murder. State v. Scroaains, 110 ldaho 380,
386, 716 P.2d 1152, 1158 (1985) ("In a prosecution for felony-murder, the state
is relieved of the burden of proving that a defendant had the specific intent to kill
and instead need only prove that all individuals charged as principles had the

specific intent to commit the predicate felony."); State v. Windsor, 110 ldaho
410, 419, 716 P.2d 1182, 1191 (1985) ("Under [Idaho's felony murder statute], a
defendant who participates in a felony can be held liable for the death of any
person killed during the commission of the felony, regardless of the individual
defendant's intent that a death occur."); see also State v. Paradis, 106 ldaho 117,
125, 676 P.2d 31, 39 (1983) ("a defendant who participates in a robbery can be
held liable for the death of any person killed during the commission of that
robbery, regardless of the individual defendant's intent that a death occur").
Thus, under the plain language of the statute, the "killing of a human being"
"committed in the perpetration of ... kidnapping" is felony murder.
Pina argues, citing authority from other jurisdictions, that the "in the
perpetration of' language of the ldaho felony murder statute requires that the
killing have been committed by an accomplice to the felony. (Appellant's brief,
pp. 13-25.)

ldaho courts, however, have consistently interpreted the "in

perpetration of' language more broadly.
ldaho Courts have held that a killing is committed in the perpetration of an
underlying felony if that killing "was part of a stream of events." State v. Fetterly,
109 ldaho 766, 771-72, 710 P.2d 1202, 1207-08 (1985); see also State v. Pratt,
125 ldaho 546, 558, 873 P.2d 800, 812 (1993) (killing was "part of a stream of
events," and therefore felony murder, even though committed after the felony
was complete). Idaho's felony murder rule requires only that the felony and the
murder "were all part of the same general occurrence." State v. Cheatham, 134
ldaho 565, 571, 6 P.3d 815, 821 (2000).

Likewise, in State v. McLeskey 138 ldaho 691, 69 P.3d 111 (2003), the
ldaho Supreme Court rejected an argument that the defendant was improperly
charged with the firearm enhancement of I.C. § 19-2520 in relation to a burgiary
where the evidence indicated he fired the gun while fleeing the premises after the
burglary. The court reasoned he was properly charged, applying the "stream of
events" rationale applicable to felony murder. As part of its analysis the court
stated, "The phrase 'in the perpetration of a crime in ldaho Code § 18-4003(d) is
synonymous with the words 'while committing' a crime in ldaho Code 3 19-2520."
In State v. Hokenson, 96 ldaho 283, 527 P.2d 487 (1974), the ldaho
Supreme Court addressed whether Hokenson was properly convicted of felony
murder where a police officer was killed trying to disarm a home-made bomb
Hokenson used in an attempted robbery, even though Hokenson himself had
been arrested before that time. Concluding he was liable, the ldaho Supreme
Court stated, "A person is criminally liable for the natural and probable
consequences of his unlawful acts as well as unlawful forces he set in motion
during the commission of an unlawful act."

at 288, 527 P.2d at 492.

Although these cases did not involve the specific claim that the killing was
not done by a co-felon, the general rule as articulated in these cases applies to
that claim. The ldaho Supreme Court has stated that defendants are responsible
for killings that occur in the "stream of events" of the felony, even after the felony
has been completed; that "in the perpetration of' as used in the felony murder
statute is synonymous with 'khile committing"; and that a defendant is
responsible for a death caused by the unlawful forces he has set in motion.

Thus, ldaho courts have already rejected arguments that the killing need further
the underlying purpose of the felony or the intent or interests of the participants in
the felony.
Here the killing was clearly in the stream of events, was done while Pina
was committing the felony, and was caused by unlawful forces Pina set in
motion. To limit his liability under the facts of this case would be to restrict
liability contrary to existing authority. The ldaho cases clearly reject a limited or
narrow reading of the "in the perpetration of' language of the felony murder rule.
This reading of ldaho law and precedent is also consistent with precedent
from other states. For example, in Miers v. State, 251 S.W.2d 404 (Tex. Crim.
App. 1952), Miers and an accomplice went into a business to rob it. The victim
struggled with Miers and was shot and killed. Miers testified that the victim had
shot himself on accident after a scuffle for Miers' gun. The court considered, in
relation to a jury instruction question, whether Miers' testimony presented an
actual defense to felony murder. The court stated:
"The whole question here is one of causal connection. If the
appellant here set in motion the cause which occasioned the death
of the deceased, we hold it to be a sound doctrine that he would be
as culpable as if he had done the deed with his own hands."

w,251 S.W.2d at 408 (quoting Taylor v. State, 55 S.W.

961, 964 (1900)

(holding defendant responsible for death of bystander where a different
bystander intervened to prevent robbery and a shootout ensued, regardless of
who actually shot the deceased)). Because Miers had "set in motion the cause
which occasioned the death of the deceased," his testimony that the victim
accidentally shot himself did not provide a defense. Mi-ers,

251 S.W.2d at 408.

Illinois courts have also adopted the proximate cause standard for felony
murder.' People v. Hudson, 856 N.E.2d 1078, 1083-84 (111. 2006). In People v.
Loweiy, 687 N.E.2d 973 (111. 1997), the Supreme Court of Illinois declined the
same proposition put forth by Pina: to switch from the proximate cause theory of
felony murder to the agency theory. Although recognizing that a majority of
jurisdictions follow the agency theory, the court rejected the agency theory. The
court reasoned that "[c]ausal relation is the universal factor common to all legal
liability."

at 976. It is thus "consistent with reason and sound public policy to

hold that when a felon's attempt to commit a forcible felony sets in motion a chain
of events which were or should have been within his contemplation when the
motion was initiated, he should be held responsible for any death which by direct
and almost inevitable sequence results from the initial criminal act." Id.; see also
Hudson, 856 N.E.2d at 1084. "Moreover, we believe that the intent behind the
felony-murder doctrine would be thwarted if we did not hold felons responsible for
the foreseeable consequences of their actions." Loweiy, 687 N.E.2d at 976.
Thus, a defendant is responsible for a death caused by the victim's forcible
resistance of the crime. Hudson, 856 N.E.2d at 1084.

' Pina seems to suggest that the adoption of the proximate cause theory of felony
murder in Illinois was by statute. (Appellant's brief, p. 21.) It appears, however,
that the lllinois legislature actually clarified in the statutory language what was
already the law of the state as found in pre-existing case-law. People v. Allen,
309 N.E.2d 544 (111. 1974) (noting that the comments to the felony murder statute
cite to People v. Pavne, 194 N.E. 539 (Ill. 1935), a case holding that the felony
murder rule applied where the killing was actually committed by the victim while
resisting the crime).

Finally, Indiana's felony murder statute provides that a defendant is guilty
of felony murder if he "kills another human being while committing" certain
enumerated felonies. Jenkins v. State, 726 N.E.2d 268, 269-70 (Ind. 2000)
(quoting lnd. Code § 35-42-1-1). The court concluded this language "does not
restrict the felony murder provision only to instances in which the felon is the
killer, but may also apply equally when, in committing any of the designated
felonies, the felon contributes to the death of any person." Jenkins, 726 N.E.2d
at 269. Thus, a defendant is guilty if the defendant's conduct was the "mediate
or immediate cause of the death."

Id.(quotation marks omitted).

Although ldaho has not explicitly rejected the agency theory for felony
murde? it has expressly adopted the proximate cause theory of liability. In
v. Hokenson, 96 ldaho 283, 527 P.2d 487 (1974), Hokenson used a home-made
~ was arrested and police seized the bomb. There was
bomb in a r ~ b b e r y .He
some dispute in the evidence about events immediately before the bomb went off
(including whether the officer pulled wires out of the bomb in an attempt to

Pina argues that the agency theory was part of the common law and therefore
implicitly adopted in ldaho. (Appellant's brief, pp. 16-20.) This argument may not
be accurate, however, as the common law felony murder rule developed merely
as a way of distinguishing between murder and manslaughter by imputing malice
to someone who himself killed another in the course of a felony, and thus was
merely a rule for imputing a mental state, not any particular act, to the defendant.
See Simon, Whose Crime Is It Anyway?: Liability For The Lethal Acts Of
Nonparticipants In The Felony, 71 U.Detroit Mercy L.Rev 223, 225-26 (Winter
1994) (and relevant footnotes). See also People v. Podolski, 52 N.W.2d 201
(Mich. 1952) (case was "within the principles of the common law, notwithstanding
the fact that the fatal bullet was fired by an officer" instead of a co-felon).
Hokenson was convicted under a reckless murder statute that was in effect for
only a short period of time, had been repealed by the time the decision was
issued in that case, and is not currently in Idaho's statutes.

disarm it), but it was clear that the bomb did explode and killed an officer. In
addressing whether Hokenson's conduct constituted felony murder, the court
stated: "The fact [Hokenson] was met by resistance on the part of his intended
victim, and in fact placed under arrest, does not release him from the final
consequences of his act."

&&

at 288, 527 P.2d at 492 (emphasis added).

Rather, a defendant "is criminally liable for the natural and probable
consequences of his unlawful acts as well as unlawful forces he set in motion
during the commission of an unlawful act."

&&

In this case, Pina kidnapped Jesse Naranjo and held him by use of a
sawed-off shotgun. Naranjo was ultimately killed with the same gun while he
sought to escape the kidnapping initiated by Pina. Pina seeks to insulate himself
from the "natural and probable consequences" of his unlawful acts and the
unlawful forces he set in motion by claiming that Shores, who actually pulled the
trigger, was not also a kidnapper. Although such a position has support in the
laws of other jurisdictions, it is unsupported by the laws of ldaho and the
precedents of its courts. ldaho has chosen to make defendants responsible for
deaths caused by the defendant's crime, not just the deaths caused by the
defendant's partners in that crime. Because Pina's suggested agency theory of
felony murder is inconsistent with existing ldaho law, he has failed to show error,
either in the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his conviction or in the alleged
failure of the jury instructions to include his theory.

D.

The Evidence Supports The Verdict Even If The Law Did Require That
The Killinq Be Committed By Someone Acting In Concert With Pina
Because it was not required under Idaho's felony murder statute that the

state prove Shores was a co-kidnapper with Pina, Pina's claim the evidence was
insufficient on this point is irrelevant. Even if this Court should adopt the agency
theory of felony murder, however, Pina has failed to show that he is entitled to an
acquittal. Pina argues that the evidence shows the actual shooter, Shores, was
not a participant in the kidnapping mostly because Shores said he was not.
(Appellant's brief, pp. 25-29.) Looking at Shores' actions, however, especially
the act of shooting Naranjo as Naranjo was about to make good his escape from
the kidnapping, shows that the jury had more than sufficient evidence that
Shores had joined the kidnapping and in fact shot Naranjo to prevent his escape.
The evidence indicated that Shores disliked Naranjo. (Trial Tr., vol. II, p.
1158, L. 2 2 - p . 1160, L. 7; vol. Ill, p. 1358, L. 2 3 - p . 1360, L. 20.) It also
indicated that the gun Pina used had been previously stolen and prepared at the
house (sawn off) prior to the events in question. (Trial Tr., vol. I, p. 541, L. 8 - p.
543, L. 3; vol. 11, p. 717, L. 16 - p. 723, L. 5.) The evidence established that
Shores asked for, and Pina handed him, the gun in the course of the kidnapping.
(Trial Tr., vol. 111, p. 1284, L. 8 - p. 1286, L. 15.) Pina, apparently, ordered
Naranjo in Spanish to kiss Shores' feet and Shores at that time kicked Naranjo in
the face. (Trial Tr., vol. Ill, p. 1165, L. 8 - p. 1166, L. 3.) While Shores held the
gun, Pina beat Naranjo. (Trial Tr., vol. Ill, p. 1287, L. 4 - p. 1288, L. 6.) Finally,
Shores shot Naranjo as Naranjo was on the verge of escaping. (Trial Tr., vol. 11,
p.958, L . 2 2 - p . 9 6 3 , L. 1; p. 1061, L . 1 8 - p . 1064, L.8;vol. III,p. 1167, L . 9 -

p.1168,L.13;p.1184,L.12-p.

1185,L.2;p.1259,L~.11-15;p.1288,L.1Q-

p. 1290, L. 11; p. 1374, L. 10 - p. 1375, L. 24.) This act, shooting Naranjo to
prevent his escape, is directly contrary to Shores' denial that he was part of the
kidnapping. (See Trial Tr., vol. Ill, p. 1536, L. 21 - p. 1538, L. 25.)
Because the evidence indicated that Shores shot Naranjo to prevent his
escape from the kidnapping, the jury could reasonably conclude that Shores was,
in fact, a kidnapper with Pina. Thus, as co-felons, both would be responsible for
the felony murder of Naranjo even if this Court should adopt the agency theory of
felony murder as proposed by Pina.
E.

Pina Has Failed To Show Anv Error In The Jurv Instructions
Pina argues that the jury instructions were erroneous for two reasons.

First, Pina argues that the jury instructions failed to set forth the agency theory
espoused by Pina both below and on appeal. (Appellant's brief, pp. 31-33.) As
set forth above, ldaho does not recognize the agency theory. The trial court's
refusal to instruct on a matter that is not an accurate statement of the law in
ldaho was not error. State v. Johns, 112 ldaho 873, 881, 736 P.2d 1327, 1335
(1987) (a defendant is not entitled to a jury instruction that is an erroneous
statement of the law, is not supported by the evidence, is an impermissible
comment on the evidence, or is adequately covered by other instructions).
Pina next argues, in the alternative, that the instructions did not
adequately convey the concept of causation.

(Appellant's brief, pp. 33-34.)

However, nothing in the record indicates that Pina objected that this instruction
was inadequate to convey the principle of causation. To the contrary, Pina

proposed a jury instruction where the causation was expressed as a finding that
"the murder ... occurred in the commission or attempted commission of
kidnaping [sic]." (Defendant's Requested Jury Instructions, No. 5.) Because
Pina did not object to the adequacy of the instructions on this ground, he must
establish fundamental error. State v. Anderson, 144 ldaho 743, 748, 170 P.3d
886, 891 (2007); I.C.R. 30(b). To show fundamental error the appellant has the
burden of showing error, Anderson, 144 ldaho at 748, 170 P.3d at 891, and that
the error was "error which so profoundly distorts the trial that it produces manifest
injustice and deprives the accused of his constitutional right to due process"
State v. Sheahan, 139 ldaho 267, 281, 77 P.3d 956, 970 (2003).
The error Pina asserts in this case is not fundamental as a matter of law.
In State v. Olin, 103 ldaho 391, 648 P.2d 203 (1982), the ldaho Supreme Court
held that a challenge the adequacy of felony murder instructions was not
reviewable under identical language as found in the current I.C.R. 30(b) ("No
party may assign as error the giving of or failure to give an instruction unless the
party objects thereto . .. .").
Even if the challenge raised on appeal is not barred by law, Pina has still
failed to show fundamental error. The instruction at issue provided that the jury
had to find, beyond a reasonable doubt, that "during the commission or
attempted commission of the kidnapping, Jesse Naranjo was killed." (Fianl [sic]
Jury Instructions, No. 22.) Pina acknowledges, as he must, that the element of
causation was not entirely omitted, but rather that the instruction failed to convey
that the killing was the "direct and foreseeable consequence" of the kidnapping.

(Appellant's brief, pp. 33-34.)

Because the element of causation was not

omitted, the error claimed was not fundamental. See Anderson, 144 Idaho at
748, 170 P.3d at 891 (omission of element of crime from instructions
fundamental error).
Nor has Pina shown any reasonable view of the evidence by which the
error could be considered fundamental. Pina argues that the jury could have
convicted even if it had concluded that (1) Pina had abandoned the kidnapping;
(2) Naranjo's act of attacking Shores and taking the gun was an intervening
cause; or (3) that Shores killed Naranjo out of animosity. (Appellant's brief, p.
33.) None of these scenarios are factually or legally relevant.
First, no reasonable view of the evidence or the law would have led to an
acquittal on the theory that Pina abandoned the kidnapping. All of the evidence
at trial was that he was actively trying to prevent Naranjo's escape at the time of
the shooting. In addition, even if he had mentally (or even physically) abandoned
the kidnapping, he would be in no different circumstances than Hokenson, who
was actually in police custody at the time his bomb killed Officer Flavel. Even if
the evidence supported the factual theory that Pina abandoned the kidnapping
(which it does not), Pina had still set unlawful forces in motion by his unlawful act,
and was responsible for their consequences.

See State v.

Hokenson, 96 ldaho

283, 288, 527 P.2d 487, 492 (1974).
Second, Pina's argument that Naranjo's acts of trying to get the gun might
be an intervening causation is without legal merit. The argument that the acts of
the victim trying to defend himself against the felony actually caused the death

and therefore insulate the defendant from liability is exactly the underlying
rationale for rejecting the agency rule in the first place.

See People v.

Hudson,

856 N.E.2d 1078, 1083-84 (111. 2006) (defendant responsible for death caused by
victim's forcible resistance to felony); Miers v. State, 251 S.W.2d 404 (Tex. Crim.
App. 1952) (defendant responsible for death of victim while resisting felony).
That a victim may forcibly resist his own kidnapping, and that death may result
there from, are exactly the sort of foreseeable results of committing certain
crimes to which the felony murder rule applies.
Third, although there is evidence that Shores bore animosity to Naranjo,
nothing in the record or the law indicates that his act of shooting Naranjo was not
proximately caused by Pina's act of kidnapping Naranjo. Naranjo was in the
house with Shores because Pina kidnapped him. Naranjo was killed with the
very weapon Pina used to kidnap him. Shores' animosity to Naranjo provided a
motive for Shores to join the kidnapping. Finally, Naranjo was killed while Pina
was still in the act of preventing Naranjo from escaping the kidnapping. In short,
Pina has failed to show any reasonable view of the evidence showing that
Naranjo was not killed as a result of "unlawful forces [Pina] set in motion during
the commission of" the kidnapping. State v. Hokenson, 96 Idaho 283, 288, 527
P.2d 487, 492 (1974). As such, he has failed to show fundamental error in the
jury instructions.

Pina Has Failed To Show The District court bused Its Discretion By Denying
Pina's Untimely Request For Self-Representation

A.

Introduction
After the presentation of evidence, Pina indicated that he did not wish to

proceed with his counsel. (Trial Tr., vol. Ill, p. 1617, Ls. 1-3 (jailer reported that
Pina would appear in court only if he could represent himself); p. 1625, L. 23 - p.
1626, L. 7 (parties resting immediately after ruling on self-representation)). The
court heard argument from counsel, and ruled that the request for selfrepresentation was untimely. (Trial Tr., vol. Ill, p. 1618, L. 3 - p. 1622, L. 5.)
Pina claims the court erred in denying the request on grounds of untimeliness,
arguing that the court was required to conduct an investigation into the grounds
for the request and balance those reasons against other factors. (Appellant's
brief, pp. 35-40.) This argument fails because the court was neither required to
make further investigation, nor has Pina shown any abuse of discretion based on
the facts before the court.

B.

Standard of Review
An appellate court reviews a trial court's discretionary decision to deny an

untimely request for self-representation under a three tiered inquiry: (1) whether
the court perceived it had discretion; (2) whether the court acted within the
boundaries of its discretion; and (3) whether it reached its decision by an
exercise of reason. State v. Reber, 138 ldaho 275, 61 P.3d 632 (Ct. App. 2002)
(citing State v. Hedcler, 115 ldaho 598, 600, 768 P.2d 1331, 1333 (1989)).

C.

Pina Has Shown No Abuse Of Discretion In The District Court's Denial Of
The Untimely Motion For Self-Representation
Although a court has discretion to consider an untimely motion for self-

representation, a defendant has no constitutional interest at stake in the denial of
such a motion. State v. Reber, 138 Idaho 275, 277-78, 61 P.3d 632, 635-36 (Ct.
App. 2002) (and cited authority). Nevertheless, a court has discretion to grant
the motion.
In

Id.

m,the trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying a request

for self-representation made after several witnesses had testified because the
timing of the motion was "inappropriate."

Id. at 278, 61 P.3d at 636.

Here the

motion was made after the state had rested and the defense had presented its
witnesses.

In addition, Pina was screaming expletives, refusing to wear his

civilian clothes, and his declared goal was to obtain a mistrial. (Trial Tr., vol. Ill,
p. 1607, L. 3 - p. 1608, L. 12.) On appeal Pina faults the trial court for failing to
make "relevant inquiries" (Appellant's brief, p. 39), but fails to acknowledge that
below he refused to even come before the court unless his demand for selfrepresentation was met.

(Trial Tr., vol. Ill, p. 1617, Ls. 1-3.)

The court

specifically stated, again unacknowledged by Pina, that it understood "this is a
discretionary call." (Trial Tr., vol. Ill, p. 1621, Ls. 5-16.) Given the timing of the
request, the circumstances and Pina's behavior attendant the request, and the
court's specific statement of its understanding of its discretion, Pina has failed to
show an abuse of discretion.

CONCLUSION
The state respectfully requests this Court to affirm Pina's conviction for
first-degree murder
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